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Abstract. Sequential game and Nash equilibrium are basic key con-
cepts in game theory. In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game
has a Nash equilibrium. The two main steps of the proof are as follows:
First, a procedure expecting a sequential game as an input is defined as
“backward induction” in game theory. Second, it is proved that the pro-
cedure yields a Nash equilibrium. “Backward induction” actually yields
Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of Nash equilibria. In 1965,
Selten named this proper subclass subgame perfect equilibria. In game
theory, payoffs are rewards usually granted at the end of a game. Al-
though traditional game theory mainly focuses on real-valued payoffs
that are implicitly ordered by the usual total order over the reals, there
is a demand for results dealing with non totally ordered payoffs. In the
mid 1950’s, works of Simon or Blackwell already involved partially or-
dered payoffs. This paper further explores the matter: it generalises the
notion of sequential game by replacing real-valued payoff functions with
abstract atomic objects, called outcomes, and by replacing the usual total
order over the reals with arbitrary binary relations over outcomes, called
preferences. This introduces a general abstract formalism where Nash
equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and “backward induction” can
still be defined. Using a lemma on topological sorting, this paper proves
that the following three propositions are equivalent: 1) Preferences over
the outcomes are acyclic. 2) Every sequential game has a Nash equilib-
rium. 3) Every sequential game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. The
result is fully computer-certified using the (highly reliable) constructive
proof assistant called Coq. Beside the additional guarantee of correct-
ness provided by the proof in Coq, the activity of formalisation also
helps clearly identify the useful definitions and the main articulations of
the proof.
Abstract sequential game, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, con-
structivism, induction, proof assistant
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1 Introduction
1.1 Game Theory in Short
Game theory embraces the theoretical study of processes involving (more or less
conscious) possibly interdependent decision makers. Game theory originates in
economics, politics, law, and also games dedicated to entertainment. Instances of
game theoretic issues may be traced back to Babylonian times when the Talmud
would prescribe marriage contracts that seem to be solutions of some relevant
games described in [7]. In 1713, a simple card game raised questions and solu-
tions involving probabilities, as discussed in [2]. During the XVIIth and XVIIIth
centuries, philosophers such as Hobbes [6] adopted an early game theoretical
approach to study political systems. In 1838, Cournot [5] introduced the no-
tion of equilibrium for pricing in duopoly. It is said that game theory became a
major field in 1944, when von Neumann and Morgenstern [15] published a sum-
mary of prior works and a systematic study of a few classes of games. In 1950,
the notion of equilibrium and the corresponding solution concept discussed by
Cournot were generalised by Nash [14] for a class of games called strategic games.
In 2006, the notion of Nash equilibrium was abstracted [12] as a situation that
no stakeholder can convert into another situation that he prefers. In addition
to economics, politics and law, modern game theory is consciously involved in
many other fields such as biology, computer science, and sociology.
1.2 Sequential Game Theory
Another class of games is that of sequential games, also called games in extensive
form. It traditionally refers to games where players play in turn till the play ends
and payoffs are granted. For instance, the game of chess is naturally modelled by
a sequential game where payoffs are “win”, “lose” and “draw”. Sequential games
are often represented by finite rooted trees each of whose internal nodes is owned
by a player, and each of whose external nodes encloses one payoff per player. In
1912, Zermelo [20] proved about the game of chess that either white can win,
or black can win, or both sides can force a draw. This is sometimes considered
as the first non-trivial theoretical results in game theory. Although the concept
of Nash equilibrium referred to strategic games in the first place, it is natural
and relevant to extend that concept to sequential games. In 1953, Kuhn [9]
showed the existence of Nash equilibrium for sequential games. For this, he built
a specific Nash equilibrium through what is called “backward induction” in game
theory. In 1965, Selten ([16] and [17]) introduced the concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium in sequential games. This is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that
seems to be even more meaningful than Nash equilibrium for sequential games.
The two concepts of “backward induction” and subgame perfect equilibrium
happen to coincide, so Kuhn’s result also guarantees existence of subgame perfect
equilibrium in sequential games. In 2006, Vestergaard [19] formalised part of
Kuhn’s result with the proof assistant Coq, for the subclass of games represented
by binary trees and whose payoffs range over the natural numbers. For this, he
defined sequential games and corresponding strategy profiles inductively.
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1.3 Ordering Payoffs
Game theory has mostly studied games with real-valued payoffs, perhaps for the
following reason: In 1944, von Neumann and Morgernstern [15] suggested that
the notion of payoff in economics could be reduced to real numbers. They argued
that more and more physical phenomena were measurable; therefore, one could
reasonably expect that payoffs in economics, although not yet measurable, would
become reducible to real numbers some day. However, game theory became pop-
ular soon thereafter, and its scope grew larger. As a result, several scientists
and philosophers questioned the reducibility of payoffs to real numbers. In 1955,
Simon [18] discussed games where agents are awarded (only partially ordered)
vectors of real-valued payoffs instead of single real-valued payoffs. In 1956, Black-
well [4] proved a result involving vectors of payoffs. Those vectors model agents
that take several non-commensurable dimensions into consideration; such games
are sometimes called multi-criteria games. In 1994, Osborne and Rubinstein [13]
mentioned arbitrary preferences, without any further results. In 2003, Krieger [8]
noticed that “backward induction” on sequential multi-criteria games may not
yield Nash equilibria, and yet showed that sequential multi-criteria games have
Nash equilibria. The proof seems to invoke probabilities and Nash’s theorem for
strategic games. In 2006, a paper [10] discussed sequential games with arbitrary
partially ordered payoffs and proved in Coq the existence of non-deterministic
Nash equilibria via “backward induction”.
1.4 Contribution
This paper contributes at both the technical and the presentation level.
There are five main technical contributions: First, an inductive formalism is
designed to represent sequential games in the constructive proof assistant Coq
([1] and [3]), and all the results in this paper are proved in Coq. Second, the new
formalism allows the paper to introduce an abstraction of traditional sequential
games and of a few related concepts. The abstraction preserves the tree structure
of the game but replaces the real-valued payoff functions, enclosed in the leaves
of the trees, by arbitrary outcomes. Each agent has a preference over outcomes,
which is given via an explicit and arbitrary binary relation. This preference re-
places the implicit and traditional “usual total order” over the real numbers.
Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria are defined accordingly. Third,
Kuhn’s result [9] is translated into the new formalism when agents’ preferences
are totally ordered. Fourth, the notion of “backward induction” is naturally
generalised for arbitrary preferences, but a simple example shows that total or-
dering of preferences is needed for “backward induction” to guarantee subgame
perfect equilibrium: the two notions of “backward induction” and subgame per-
fect equilibrium coincide for total orders but not in general. Fifth, Kuhn’s result
is substantially generalised as follows. On the one hand, an intermediate result
proves that smaller preferences, i.e., binary relations with less arcs, yield more
equilibria than bigger preferences. On the other hand, a topological sorting re-
sult was formally proved in [11]. By both results mentioned above, acyclicity of
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the preferences proves to be a necessary and sufficient condition for every game
to have a Nash equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium.
This paper deals with basic notions of game theory that are all exemplified
and defined before they are used. Most of the time, these notions are explained in
three different ways, with the second one helping make the connection between
the two others: First, the notions are presented in a graphical formalism close
to traditional game theory. Second, they are presented in a graphical formalism
suitable for induction. Third, they are presented in a light Coq formalism close to
traditional mathematics, so that only a basic understanding of Coq is needed. (A
quick look at the first ten pages of [11] will introduce the reader to the required
notions.) The proofs are structured along the corresponding Coq proofs but are
written in plain English.
1.5 Contents
Section 2 gives an intuitive and informal presentation of traditional sequential
games through graphical examples. Section 3 explores further the relevance of
non-totally ordered payoffs. Section 4 discusses general concepts that are not
specially related to game theory but required in the remainder of the paper.
Section 5 presents the above-mentioned abstraction of sequential games and
their new formalism. Section 6 presents the notion of strategy profile at the
same level of abstraction as for sequential games. Section 7 defines convertibility
between strategy profiles. Section 8 discusses the notion of preference, happiness,
Nash equilibrium, and subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 9 generalises “back-
ward induction”, translates Kuhn’s result into the new formalism, and proves
the triple equivalence between acyclicity of preferences and existence of Nash
equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium.
2 Traditional Sequential Game Theory
Through graphical examples and explanations in plain English, this section gives
an intuitive and informal presentation of traditional sequential games and of a
few related concepts such as Nash equilibrium.
A traditional sequential game involves finitely many agents and payoffs. Pay-
offs usually are real numbers. A payoff function is a function from the agents to
the payoffs. A sequential game is a rooted finite tree with internal nodes labelled
with agents and external nodes, i.e., leaves, labelled with payoff functions. Con-
sider the following graphical example of such games. It involves the two agents a
and b. At every leaf, a payoff function is represented by two numbers separated
by a comma: the payoff function maps agent a to the first number and agent b
to the second number.
a
b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1
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Such game trees are interpreted as follows: A play of a game starts at the
root of the game tree. If the tree is a leaf then agents are rewarded according
to the enclosed payoff function. Otherwise, the agent owning the root chooses
the next node among the children of the root. The subtree rooted at the chosen
child is considered and the play continues from there. In the game above, if a
chooses to go right then both agents get 2. If a chooses left then b has to choose
too, etc. Now, a specific play of a game is described and drawn. Double lines
represent choices made during the play. Agent a first chooses to go right, then
left, then b chooses to go right. Eventually, a gets 1, b gets 0, and c gets 2. The
stars ∗ represent arbitrary payoff functions irrelevant to the discussion.
a a a
b c a b c a b c a
∗ ∗ ∗ b ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ b ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ b ∗
∗ 1, 0, 2 ∗ 1, 0, 2 ∗ 1, 0, 2
In game theory, the strategy of an agent is an object that accounts for the
decisions of the agent in all situations that the agent might encounter. A strategy
profile is a tuple combining one strategy per agent. So, for sequential games, a
strategy profile amounts to choices made at all internal nodes of the tree. Below
is an example of a strategy profile. Double lines between nodes represent choices
and the stars ∗ represent arbitrary payoff functions irrelevant to the discussion.
The choice of b at the leftmost internal node may seem rather ineffective, but it
can be interpreted as b’s choice if a play ever reach this very node.
a
b c a
∗ ∗ ∗ b ∗
∗ 1, 0, 2
Given a strategy profile, starting from the root and following the agents’
consecutive choices leads to one leaf. The payoff function enclosed in that specific
leaf is called the induced payoff function. The induced payoff function of the
strategy profile above is: a gets 1, b gets 0, and c gets 2.
The (usually implicit) preference of agents for strictly greater payoffs induces
a (usually implicit) preference of an agent for payoff functions that grants him
strictly greater payoffs. This, in turn, yields a (usually implicit) preference of
an agent for strategy profiles inducing preferred payoff functions. Below, agent
a prefers the left-hand strategy profile to the right-hand one since 3 is greater
than 2, but it is the opposite for agent b since 1 is less than 2.
a a
b 2, 2 b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1 1, 0 3, 1
An agent is (usually implicitly) granted the ability to change his choices at
all nodes he owns. For instance, below, the agent b can convert the strategy
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profile on the left to the one on the right by changing his choices exactly at the
nodes where b is displayed in bold font. The stars ∗ represent arbitrary payoff
functions irrelevant to the discussion.
a a
b b b b b b
∗ a ∗ b ∗ ∗ ∗ a ∗ b ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
An agent is said to be happy with a strategy profile if he cannot convert
it to another strategy profile that he prefers. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile that makes all agents happy. Below, the strategy profile to the left is not a
Nash equilibrium since its sole player gets 0 but can convert it to the right-hand
strategy profile and get 1. However, the right-hand strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium since a cannot convert it and get a payoff strictly greater than 1.
a a
0 1 1 0 1 1
Here is another example of Nash equilibrium.
a
b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1
Indeed, agent a could only convert the strategy profile above to the left-hand
strategy profile below, and would get 2 instead of 3. Therefore a is happy. Agent
b could only convert the strategy profile above to the right-hand strategy profile
below, and would get 0 instead of 1. Therefore b is happy too. The strategy
profile above makes all players happy; it is a Nash equilibrium.
a a
b 2, 2 b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1 1, 0 3, 1
The underlying game of a strategy profile is computed by forgetting all the
choices made at the internal nodes of the strategy profile. The next picture
displays a strategy profile, to the left, and its underlying game, to the right.
a a
b 2, 2 b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1 1, 0 3, 1
Two Nash equilibria inducing different payoff functions may have the same
underlying game: indeed, consider the previous Nash equilibrium and the fol-
lowing one, where b’s choice is ineffective in terms of induced payoff function.
a
b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1
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A given game is said to have a Nash equilibrium if there exists a Nash equi-
librium whose underlying game is the given game. In order to prove that every
sequential game has a Nash equilibrium, one can use a construction called “back-
ward induction” in game theory. It consists in building a strategy profile from
a sequential game. Performing “backward induction” on the following example
will help describe and interpret the idea of the construction.
a
b b
a 3, 1 2, 2 4, 1
1, 0 0, 2
If a play starts at the leftmost and lowest node of the game above, then agent
a faces the following game:
a
1, 0 0, 2
So, provided that a is “rational” in some informal sense, he chooses left and
get 1 instead of 0. In the same way, if the play starts at the rightmost node, b
chooses left and get 2 instead of 1. These two remarks correspond to the leftmost
picture below. Provided that agent b is aware of a’s “rational” behaviour, if a
play starts at the left node owned by b, then b chooses right and get 1 instead
of 0, as shown on the second picture below. The last picture shows that when
a play starts at the root, as in the usual interpretation of a sequential game, a
chooses left and gets 3 instead of 2. In such a process, an agent facing several
options equivalent in terms of payoffs may choose either of them.
a a a
b b b b b b
a 3, 1 2, 2 4, 1 a 3, 1 2, 2 4, 1 a 3, 1 2, 2 4, 1
1, 0 0, 2 1, 0 0, 2 1, 0 0, 2
A strategy profile built by “backward induction” is a Nash equilibrium whose
underlying game is the original game. (A formal proof relying on formal defini-
tions is presented in a later section.) This way, it is proved that all sequential
games have Nash equilibria. However, the next example shows that not all Nash
equilibria are obtained by “backward induction”. Even stronger, a Nash equilib-
rium may induce a payoff function induced by no “backward induction” strategy
profile. Indeed, the left-hand strategy profile below is a Nash equilibrium that
is not a “backward induction”, and the only “backward induction” on the same
underlying game is shown on the right-hand side.
a a
b 2, 2 b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1 1, 0 3, 1
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Traditional game theory uses the following definition of subtree: all the de-
scendants of a node of a tree define a subtree. For instance consider the following
game.
a
b b
a 3, 1 2, 2 4, 1
1, 0 0, 2
In addition to the leaves, the proper subtrees of the game above are listed
below.
b a b
a 3, 1 1, 0 0, 2 2, 2 4, 1
1, 0 0, 2
With this definition of subtree, a subgame perfect equilibrium is defined as
a Nash equilibrium all of whose substrategy profiles are also Nash equilibria. In
traditional game theory, the notions of subgame perfect equilibrium and “back-
ward induction” strategy profile coincide.
3 Why Total Order?
Section 2 only deals with real-valued, totally ordered payoffs. However, as men-
tioned in subsection 1.3, there is a need for game theoretic results involving
non totally ordered payoffs. This section adds simple and informal arguments
to the discussion. In particular, it shows that the class of traditional sequential
games naturally induces two classes of games slightly more general than itself.
For these classes of games, the question whether Nash equilibria/subgame per-
fect equilibria exist or not is still relevant, and has yet not been addressed by
Kuhn’s result.
3.1 Selfishness Refinements
An agent that gives priority to his own payoffs without taking other agents into
consideration is called selfish. It is the case in traditional game theory. Now
consider a benevolent agent that takes all agents, including him, into account,
e.g., in a Pareto style. More specifically, consider two payoff functions p and p′.
If for each agent, p grants a payoff greater than or equal to the one granted by
p′, and if there exists one agent to whom p grants strictly greater payoff than
p′, then the benevolent agent prefers p to p′. For instance, consider three agents
a, b and c, and three payoff functions (1, 3, 0), (1, 2, 1), and (1, 2, 0). (The first
component corresponds to a, the second to b, and the third to c.) A benevolent
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agent prefers the first two to the last one, but has no preference among the first
two.
An agent is selfish-benevolent if his preference is the union of selfish and
benevolent preferences. Put otherwise, an agent prefers a payoff function to
another one if he prefers it either selfishly or benevolently. For instance, con-
sider the previous example. Assume that all agents are selfish-benevolent. So, b
prefers (1, 3, 0) to (1, 2, 1) since 3 is greater than 2, prefers (1, 2, 1) to (1, 2, 0) by
benevolence, and prefers (1, 3, 0) to (1, 2, 0) by both selfishness and benevolence.
Selfishness-benevolence induces a partial order over real-valued payoff functions.
In the same way, an agent may be selfish-malevolent. More specifically, con-
sider two payoff functions p and p′. If p grants a selfish-malevolent agent a payoff
greater than the one granted by p′ then the agent prefers p to p′. If p and p′ grant
the same payoff to the selfish-malevolent agent, and if p grants every other agent
a payoff lesser than or equal to the one granted by p′, and if there exists one agent
to whom p grants strictly lesser payoff than p′, then the selfish-malevolent agent
prefers p to p′. Selfishness-malevolence induces a partial order over real-valued
payoff functions too.
3.2 Lack of Information
Consider an agent that prefers greater payoffs and that is “rational”, i.e., acts
according to his preferences. Imagine the following 1-player game played by the
above-mentioned agent: when a play starts, the agent has two options, say left
and right. If he chooses left then he gets either 0 or 5, and if he chooses right
then he gets either 1 or 2 or 3. After payoffs are granted, the play ends. This
game is represented below.
a
{0, 5} {1, 2, 3}
The wording “either... or...”, in the phrase “either 0 or 5” does not refer to
any procedure whatsoever. Therefore, in each case the agent has no clue how
payoffs are going to be granted. It is worth stressing that, in particular, “either 0
or 5” does not refer to probability half for 0 and probability half for 5. It does not
refer to probabilities at all. As a result, the agent cannot dismiss for sure any of
his options in the game above. The two options are not comparable; the payoffs
are not totally ordered. This type of game can even help understand traditional
sequential games better. Indeed, consider the traditional sequential game below,
where a and b are “rational”, and therefore only care about maximising their
own payoffs. Also assume that a knows b’s being “rational”.
a
b b
0, 0 5, 0 1, 0 2, 0 3, 0
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Whatever agent a may choose, b’s options are equivalent since they yield the
same payoff. Therefore a has no clue how b is going to choose: Go left when
left and right are equivalent? Toss a coin? Phone a friend? So, from agent a’s
viewpoint, the game above reduces to the 1-player game discussed before. In this
subsection, non totally ordered payoffs represents lack of information without
invoking a formalism dedicated to knowledge representation such as epistemic
logic.
When payoffs are non-empty sets of real numbers instead of single real num-
bers, as in the first example above, there are several ways to define relevant
preferences. For instance, agents can focus either on the lower bound of the set,
which amounts to guaranteeing a minimum, or on the upper bound of the set,
which amounts to letting hope for a maximum, or both at once. Most of these
yield partial orders over non-empty sets of reals.
4 Preliminaries
Prior to the game theoretic development presented in Coq in later sections, a
few general concepts and related results are needed. Part of them are mentioned
in [11]: list inclusion, subrelation, restriction of a relation to the elements of a
list, etc. This section completes the inventory of the required notions, in the Coq
formalism.
A first useful result reads as follows: given a binary relation and two lists,
one included in the other, the restriction of the relation to the smaller list is a
subrelation of the restriction of the relation to the bigger list. The proof is a
straightforward unfolding of the definitions, and the result is formally written
below.
Lemma sub rel restriction incl : ∀ (B : Set)(l l’ : list B) R,
incl l l’ → sub rel (restriction R l) (restriction R l’).
The remainder of this section presents the extension to lists of four concepts
usually pertaining to one or two objects only.
4.1 Extension of Predicates to Lists
Let A be a Set. The function listforall expects a predicate on A, i.e., an object of
type A → Prop, and returns a predicate on lists, i.e., an object of type list A →
Prop, stating that all the elements in the list comply with the original predicate.
It is recursively defined along the inductive structure of the list argument.
Fixpoint listforall (Q : A → Prop)(l : list A){struct l} : Prop :=
match l with
| nil ⇒ True
| x ::l’ ⇒ Q x ∧ listforall Q l’
end.
In the first line above, Fixpoint starts the recursive definition, listforall is the
name of the defined function, Q is the predicate argument, l is the list argument,
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{struct l}means that the recursion involves l, and Prop is the type of the output.
The match performs a case splitting on the structure of l. The line thereafter
specifies that the function returns True for empty list arguments. The last line
is the core of the recursion: in order to compute the result for the list, it refers
to the result of the computation involving the tail, which is a strictly smaller
argument. This ensures termination of the computation, therefore the function is
well defined. An example of computation of listforall is given below. The symbol
 represents a computation step.
listforall Q (x ::y::z ::nil)  Q x ∧ listforall Q (y::z ::nil)  
Q x ∧ Q y ∧ listforall Q (z ::nil)  Q x ∧ Q y ∧ Q z ∧ listforall Q nil  
Q x ∧ Q y ∧ Q z ∧ True
Note that Q x ∧ Q y ∧ Q z ∧ True is equivalent to Q x ∧ Q y ∧ Q z, which
is what the function listforall is meant for.
The following four lemmas involve the notion of appending (++), also called
concatenation, of two lists. It is defined in the Coq Standard Library. The four
lemmas express basic properties of the listforall function. They are all proved
by induction on the list l.
Lemma listforall app : ∀ Q l’ l,
listforall Q l → listforall Q l’ → listforall Q (l++l’).
Lemma listforall appl : ∀ Q l’ l, listforall Q (l++l’) → listforall Q l.
Lemma listforall appr : ∀ Q l’ l, listforall Q (l++l’) → listforall Q l’.
Lemma listforall In : ∀ Q x l, In x l → listforall Q l → Q x.
4.2 Extension of Functions to Lists
The Coq Standard Library provides a function map that, given a list and a
function f, returns a list with the images by f of the elements of the original list.
It is defined by recursion.
Fixpoint map (A B : Set)(f : A → B)(l : list A) : list B :=
match l with
| nil ⇒ nil
| a::t ⇒ (f a)::(map A B f t)
end.
Consider the simplified computation example below, where domains and
codomains of f are omitted for better readability.
map f (x ::y::z ::nil)  · · · (f x )::(f y)::(f z )::nil
The next two lemmas state map’s preserving two functions being inverse
and commutativity between map and appending. Both lemmas are proved by
induction on the list l. The second one comes from the Coq Standard Library [1].
Lemma map inverse : ∀ (A B : Set)(f : A → B) g,
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(∀ x, g (f x )=x ) → ∀ l, map g (map f l)=l.
Lemma map app : ∀ (A B : Set)l l’ (f : A → B), map f (l++l’) = (map f
l)++(map f l’).
4.3 Extension of Binary Relations to Lists
Let A be a Set. Given a binary relation P : A→ A→ Prop, the function rel vector
expects two lists over A and states that they are component-wise related by P.
Note that if they are component-wise related then their lengths are the same.
Fixpoint rel vector (P : A → A → Prop)(l l’ : list A) {struct l}: Prop :=
match l with
| nil ⇒ l’=nil
| x ::l2 ⇒ match l’ with
| nil ⇒ False
| x’ ::l2’ ⇒ P x x’ ∧ rel vector P l2 l2’
end
end.
The following examples describe three typical computations of the rel vector
predicate.
rel vector P (x ::y::nil) (x’ ::y’ ::nil)  P x x’ ∧ rel vector P (y::nil) (y’ ::nil)  
P x x’ ∧ P y y’ ∧ rel vector P (nil) (nil)  P x x’ ∧ P y y’ ∧ nil=nil
Note that P x x’ ∧ P y y’ ∧ nil=nil is equivalent to P x x’ ∧ P y y’.
rel vector P (x ::y::nil) (x’ ::nil)  P x x’ ∧ rel vector P (y::nil) (nil)  
P x x’ ∧ False
Note that P x x’ ∧ False is equivalent to False.
rel vector P (x ::nil) (x’ ::y’nil)  P x x’ ∧ rel vector P (nil) (y’ ::nil)  
P x x’ ∧ y’ ::nil=nil
Note that P x x’ ∧ y’ ::nil=nil is equivalent to False since y’ ::nil=nil is
equivalent to False.
The following lemma states that if two lists are component-wise related, then
two elements occurring at the same place in each list are also related.
Lemma rel vector app cons same length : ∀ P a a’ m m’ l l’,
rel vector P (l++a::m) (l’++a’ ::m’) → length l=length l’ → P a a’.
Proof Let P be a binary relation over A, let a and a’ be in A, and let m and
m’ be lists over A. Prove ∀ l l’, rel vector P (l++a::m) (l’++a’ ::m’) → length
l=length l’ → P a a’ by induction on l. For the inductive case, implying that l’
is non-empty, apply the induction hypothesis with the tail of l’. 
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The next result shows that if two lists are component-wise related, then given
one element in the second list, one can compute an element of the first list such
that both elements are related.
Lemma rel vector app cons exists : ∀ P a q l m,
rel vector P l (m++a::q) → {x : A | In x l ∧ P x a}.
Proof By induction on l and case splitting on m being empty. For the in-
ductive case, if m is empty then the head of l is a witness, if m is not empty
then use the induction hypothesis with the tail of m; the computable element is
a witness. 
The following lemma says that if two lists are component-wise related, then
given one element in the first list and one in the second list, but at different
places, there is another element in the first list, either before or after the element
mentioned first, that is related to the element of the second list.
Lemma rel vector app cons different length : ∀ P l a m l’ a’ m’,
rel vector P (l++a::m) (l’++a’ ::m’) → length l 6=length l’ → {x : A | (In x l
∨ In x m) ∧ P x a’}.
Proof By induction on l. For the base case, l is empty, if l’ is empty then it
is straightforward, if l’ is not empty then applying rel vector app cons exists
gives a witness. For the inductive case, l is not empty, case split on l’ being
empty and use the induction hypothesis when l’ is not empty. 
4.4 No Successor
Let A be a Set. Given a binary relation, the predicate is no succ returns a
proposition saying that a given element is the predecessor of no element in a
given list.
Definition is no succ (P : A → A → Prop)(x : A)(l : list A) :=
listforall (fun y → ¬P x y) l.
The next two results show a transitivity property and decidability of is no succ
when built on a decidable binary relation. Both are proved by induction on the
list l.
Lemma is no succ trans : ∀ P x y l,
transitive A P → P x y → is no succ P x l → is no succ P y l.
Lemma is no succ dec : ∀ P, rel dec P → ∀ x l,
{is no succ P x l}+{¬is no succ P x l}.
The following lemma helps generalise the notion of “backward induction” in
section 9. Assume P a decidable binary relation over A, and x ::l a non-empty list
over A. The list x ::l can be computabily split into a left list, a chosen element,
and a right list such that 1) the chosen element has no P -successor in the right
list, 2) the chosen element is the first (from left to right) element with such
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a property, and moreover 3) if P is irreflexive and transitive then the chosen
element has no P -successor in the left list either. The form of the statement
has being slightly simplified, as compared to the actual Coq code. The first
conjunct corresponds to the splitting of the list x ::l, and the last three conjuncts
correspond to the points 1), 2) and 3)as mentioned above.
Lemma Choose and split : ∀ P, rel dec P → ∀ (l : list A)(x : A),
{(left,choice,right) : list A × A × list A |
x ::l=(left++(choice::right))
∧
is no succ P choice right
∧
(∀ left’ choice’ right’, left=left’++(choice’ ::right’) →
¬is no succ P choice’ (right’++(choice::right)))
∧
(irreflexive P → transitive P → is no succ P choice left)}.
Proof Assume that P is decidable and proceed by induction on l, the tail of
the non-empty list. For the base case where the tail is empty, nil, x, and nil are
witnesses for the required left list, choice element, and right list. For the step
case, l=a::l’, case split on x having a successor in l. If not, then nil, x, and l are
a witness. If x has a successor in l then use the induction hypothesis with a,
which splits the list l into a left list, a choice element, and a right list. Put x on
the top of the left list, here are the three witnesses. 
For example, consider the partial order induced by divisibility of natural
numbers by natural numbers. For the list 2 :: 3 :: 9 :: 4 :: 9 :: 6 :: 2 :: 16 :: nil, the
choice is 9, the left list is 2 :: 3 :: 9 :: 4 :: nil, and the right list is 6 :: 2 :: 16 :: nil.
2 :: 3 :: 9 :: 4 :: 9 :: 6 :: 2 :: 16 :: nil
Choose and split
left list choice right list
2 :: 3 :: 9 :: 4 :: nil 9 6 :: 2 :: 16 :: nil
Indeed, the first 2 can divide 4 written on its right, 3 can divide 9 written on
its right, the first 9 can divide the other 9 written on its right, the 4 can divide
16 written on its right, but the second 9 cannot divide any number written on
its right.
5 Sequential Games
By abstracting over payoff functions, subsection 5.1 generalises the notion of se-
quential game. In the remainder of this paper, the expression “sequential game”
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refers to the new and abstract sequential games, unless stated otherwise. In ad-
dition, subsection 5.1 introduces a new formalism for sequential games. In sub-
section 5.2, an inductive proof principle is designed for these sequential games.
Last, subsection 5.3 defines a function related to sequential games.
5.1 Definition of Sequential Games
This subsection first presents sequential games informally in the way traditional
sequential games were presented in section 2. Then it describes sequential games
in a both inductive and graphical formalism, and makes a link with the tradi-
tional formalism. Last, the inductive and graphical formalism is naturally trans-
lated into a definition of sequential games in Coq.
The Traditional Way: Informally, consider a collection of outcomes that are
the possible end-of-the-game situations, and a collection of agents that are the
possible stake-holders and decision makers. Roughly speaking, an abstract se-
quential game is a traditional sequential game where each real-valued payoff
function (enclosed in a leaf) has been replaced by an outcome. Below, the left-
hand picture represents a traditional sequential game, and the right-hand picture
represents an abstract sequential game on the same tree structure.
a a
b 2, 2 b oc3
1, 0 3, 1 oc1 oc2
The Inductive and Graphical Way: In what follows, a generic game g will
be represented by the left-hand picture below and a generic (possibly empty)
list of games by the right-hand picture.
g
l
Sequential games are inductively defined in two steps. First step: If oc is an
outcome then the object below is a game.
oc
Second step: if a is an agent and if the first two objects below are a game
and a list of games, then the rightmost object is also a game.
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ag
l
g
l
The major difference between the traditional formalism and the new for-
malism is as follows: In the traditional formalism, an internal node had one or
arbitrarily many more children, which are games. In the new formalism instead,
an internal node has one left child, which is a game, and one right child, which
is a list of games. The next two pictures represent the same game in both for-
malisms, where for all i between 0 and n, the object g′i is the translation of gi
from the traditional formalism into the new formalism.
a a
g0 g1
. . .
gn g′0
g′1 . . . g
′
n :: nil
For instance, let a, b and c be three agents, and oc1, oc2, oc3 and oc4 be four
outcomes. Consider the following game in the traditional formalism.
a
b c oc4
oc1 oc2 oc3
The game above is represented by the following game in the new formalism.
a
b c :: oc4 ::
nil
oc1 oc2 ::
nil
oc3
nil
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The Inductive and Formal Way: Formally in Coq, games are defined as
follows. First define Outcome and Agent, two arbitrary objects of type Set.
Variable Outcome : Set.
Variable Agent : Set.
Next, the object Game is defined by induction.
Inductive Game : Set :=
| gL : Outcome → Game
| gN : Agent → Game → list Game → Game.
gL stands for “game leaf” and gN for “game node”. If oc is an Outcome, then
gL oc is a Game. If a is an Agent, g is a Game, and l is a list of objects in Game,
then gN a g l is a Game. The interpretation of such an object is as follows: the
agent a “owns” the root of gN a g l, and g and l represent a’s options, i.e., the
subgames a can decide to continue the play in. The structure ensures that any
node of the tree meant to be internal has a non-zero number of children. The
inductive Coq formalism and the inductive graphical formalism are very close to
each other. For instance, compare the game gN a (gN b oc1 oc2 ::nil) oc3 ::nil
with its representation in the inductive graphical formalism below.
a
b oc3 ::
nil
oc1 oc2 ::
nil
Note that the inductive definition of games involves lists, which are already
an inductive structure. Therefore, the game structure is inductive “horizontally
and vertically”.
5.2 Induction Principle for Sequential Games
This subsection first discusses what would be an inductive proof principle for
games in the traditional formalism. The failure of the former leads to an induc-
tion principle in the inductive graphical formalism. Then, the induction principle
is easily translated in Coq formalism.
The Traditional Way: In the traditional formalism, a so-called induction
principle would read as follows. In order to check that a predicate holds for all
games, check two properties: First, check that the predicate holds for all games
that are leaves (enclosing an outcome). Second, check that if the predicate holds
for all the following games,
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g0 g1
. . .
gn
then, for any agent a, it holds for the following game.
a
g0 g1
. . .
gn
However, dots, etc’s and so on, very seldom suit formal proofs. While some
dots may be easily formalised, some others cannot. In the new formalism pro-
posed for games, they are formalised by lists. So, an induction principle for games
must take lists into account.
The Inductive and Graphical Way: In order to prove that the predicate P
holds for all games, it suffices to design a predicate Q expecting a game and a
list of games, and then to check that all the properties listed below hold.
– For all outcome oc, P ( oc ).
– For all game g , if P ( g ) then Q ( g ,
nil
)
– For all game g and g’ and all list of game l
,
if P ( g ) and Q ( g’ , l
) then Q ( g’ , g::l
)
– For all agent a, all game g and all list of game
l
,
if Q ( g ,
l
) then P (
a
g
l
)
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The Inductive and Formal Way: The induction principle that Coq automat-
ically associates to the inductively defined structure of games is not efficient. A
convenient principle has to be built (and hereby proved) manually, via a recursive
function and the command fix. That leads to the following induction principle,
which is therefore a theorem in Coq.
Game ind2 : ∀ (P : Game → Prop) (Q : Game → list Game → Prop),
(∀ oc, P (gL oc)) →
(∀ g, P g → Q g nil) →
(∀ g, P g → ∀ g’ l, Q g’ l → Q g’ (g :: l)) →
(∀ g l, Q g l → ∀ a, P (gN a g l)) →
∀ g, Pg
Two facts are worth noting: First, this principle corresponds to the one stated
above in the inductive graphical formalism. Second, in order to prove a property
∀ g : Game, Pg with the induction principle Game ind2, the user has to imagine
a workable predicate Q.
5.3 Outcomes Used in a Sequential Game
This subsection discusses the notion of outcomes used in a sequential game and
defines a function that returns the “left-to-right” list of all the outcomes involved
in a given game. Two lemmas follow the definition of the function in the Coq
formalism.
The Traditional Way: The example below explains what function is intended.
a
b oc3  oc1 :: oc2 :: oc3 :: nil
oc1 oc2
The Inductive and Graphical Way: To prepare the full formalisation of
the idea above, the intended function is defined inductively with the inductive
graphical formalism, in two steps along the structure of games. First step: the
only outcome used in a leaf is the outcome enclosed in the leaf.
oc
UO
 oc :: nil
Second step: recall that ++ refers to lists appending/concatenation.
a
g0
g1 . . . gn :: nil
UO
 UO(g0) + +UO(g1) + + · · ·++UO(gn)
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The Inductive and Formal Way: The intended function, called UsedOut-
comes, is inductively and formally defined in Coq.
Fixpoint UsedOutcomes (g : Game) : list Outcome :=
match g with
| gL oc ⇒ oc::nil
| gN g’ l ⇒ ((fix ListUsedOutcomes (l’ : list Game) : list Outcome :=
match l’ with
| nil ⇒ nil
| x ::m ⇒ (UsedOutcomes x )++(ListUsedOutcomes m)
end) (g’ ::l))
end.
The following lemma states that the outcomes used in a game are also used
in a structurally bigger game.
Lemma UsedOutcomes gN : ∀ a g g’ l,
In g (g’ ::l) → incl (UsedOutcomes g) (UsedOutcomes (gN a g’ l)).
Proof By induction on l. For the inductive step case split as follows. If g
equals the head of l then invoke incl appr, incl appl, and incl refl. If g either
equals g’ or occurs in the tail of l then the induction hypothesis says that the
outcomes used by g are used by g’ and l together. The remainder mainly applies
in app or and in or app. 
The next result shows that if the outcomes used in a game all occur in a
given list, then so do the outcomes used in any subgame of the original game.
Lemma UsedOutcomes gN listforall : ∀ a g loc l,
incl (UsedOutcomes (gN a g l)) loc → listforall (fun g’ : Game ⇒ incl (Used-
Outcomes g’) loc) (g::l).
Proof All the following cases invoke in or app. It is straightforward for g.
For elements of l proceed by induction on l. For the inductive step, it is straight-
forward for the head of l, and use the induction hypothesis for elements of the
tail of l. 
6 Strategy Profiles
Consistent with subsection 5.1, subsection 6.1 generalises the notion of strategy
profile by abstracting over payoff functions, and introduces a new formalism for
them. In the remainder of this paper, the expression “strategy profile” refers to
the new and abstract strategy profiles, unless stated otherwise. In subsection 6.2,
an inductive proof principle is designed for these strategy profiles. Subsection 6.3
defines the underlying game of a strategy profile. Last, subsection 6.4 defines the
induced outcome of a strategy profile.
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6.1 Definition of Strategy Profiles
This subsection first presents strategy profiles informally in the way traditional
strategy profiles were presented in section 2. Then it describes strategy profiles
in a both inductive and graphical formalism consistent with the one used to
define sequential games. A correspondence between the traditional formalism
and the new one is established. Finally, the inductive and graphical formalism
is naturally translated into a definition of strategy profiles in Coq.
The Traditional Way: Roughly speaking, an abstract strategy profile is a
traditional strategy profile where each real-valued payoff function (enclosed in a
leaf) has been replaced by an outcome. Below, the left-hand picture represents
a traditional strategy profile, and the right-hand picture represents an abstract
strategy profile on the same tree structure.
a a
b 2, 2 b oc3
1, 0 3, 1 oc1 oc2
The Inductive and Graphical Way: A generic strategy profile s will be
represented by the left-hand picture below and a generic (possibly empty) list
of strategy profiles by the right-hand picture.
s l
Strategy profiles are inductively defined in two steps. First step: If oc is an
outcome then the object below is a strategy profile.
oc
Second step: if a is an agent and the first three objects below are a strategy
profile and two lists of strategy profiles, then the rightmost object is also a
strategy profile.
a
s l l’ l s l’
The major difference between the traditional formalism and the new for-
malism is as follows: In the traditional formalism, an internal node has one or
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arbitrarily many more children, which are strategy profiles, and in addition an
internal node is linked to one and only one of its children by a double line. In
the new formalism, an internal node has one left child, which is a list of strategy
profiles, one central child, which is a strategy profile corresponding to the double
line, and one right child, which is a list of strategy profiles. The next two pictures
represent the same strategy profile in both formalisms, where for all i between 0
and n, the object s′i is the translation of si from the traditional formalism into
the new formalism.
a
s0
. . .
si
. . .
sn
a
s′0 . . . s
′
i−1 :: nil
s′i
s′i+1 . . . s
′
n :: nil
For instance, let a and b be two agents, and oc1, oc2 and oc3 be three out-
comes. Consider the following strategy profile in the traditional formalism.
a
b oc3
oc1 oc2
The strategy profile above is represented by the following strategy profile in
the new formalism.
a
nil
b oc3 ::
nil
oc1 ::
nil
oc2
nil
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The Inductive and Formal Way: Formally in Coq, strategy profiles are
defined as follows.
Inductive Strat : Set :=
| sL : Outcome → Strat
| sN : Agent → list Strat → Strat → list Strat → Strat.
sL stands for “strategy profile leaf” and sN for “strategy profile node”. If oc
is an Outcome, then sL oc is a Strat. If a is an Agent, if s is a Strat, and if l and
l’ are lists of objects in Strat, then sN a l s l’ is a Strat. The interpretation of
such an object is as follows: as for sequential games, the agent a “owns” the root
of sN a l s l’. Moreover, s is the substrategy profile a has decided the play shall
continue in, and l and l’ represent the options dismissed by a on the left and
on the right of s. The structure ensures that any node of the tree meant to be
internal has a non-zero number of children, and that one and only one child has
been chosen. Like for sequential games, the inductive graphical formalism and
the inductive Coq formalism are very close to each other for strategy profiles. For
instance, compare the strategy profile sN a nil (sN b oc1 ::nil oc2 nil) oc3 ::nil
with its representation in the inductive graphical formalism above.
6.2 Induction Principle for Strategy Profiles
This subsection discusses what would be an inductive proof principle for strat-
egy profiles in the traditional formalism. The failure of the former leads to an
induction principle in the inductive Coq formalism.
The Traditional Way: In the traditional formalism, a so-called induction
principle would read as follows. In order to check that a predicate holds for all
strategy profiles, check two properties: First, check that the predicate holds for
all strategy profiles that are leaves (enclosing an outcome). Second, check that
if the predicate holds for all the following strategy profiles,
s0
. . .
sn
then, for any agent a and any i between 0 and n, it holds for the following
strategy profile.
a
s0
. . .
si
. . .
sn
However, dots, etc’s and so on, very seldom suit formal proofs. While some
dots may be easily formalised, some others cannot. In the inductive formalism
proposed in this paper, they are formalised by lists. So, an induction principle
for games must take lists into account.
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The Inductive and Formal Way: The induction principle that Coq auto-
matically associates to the inductively defined structure of strategy profiles is
not efficient. A convenient principle has to be built (and hereby proved) manu-
ally, via a recursive function and the command fix. That leads to the following
induction principle, which is therefore a theorem in Coq. In order to prove that
a predicate P holds for all strategy profiles, it suffices to design a predicate Q
expecting a strategy profile and a list of strategy profiles, and then to check that
several fixed properties hold, as formally stated below.
Strat ind2 : ∀ (P : Strat → Prop) (Q : list Strat → Strat → list Strat → Prop),
(∀ oc, P (sL oc)) →
(∀ sc, P sc → Q nil sc nil) →
(∀ s, P s → ∀ sc sr, Q nil sc sr → Q nil sc (s :: sr)) →
(∀ s, P s → ∀ sc sl sr, Q sl sc sr → Q (s :: sl) sc sr) →
(∀ sc sl sr, Q sl sc sr → ∀ a, P (sN a sl sc sr)) →
∀ s, P s
6.3 Underlying Game of a Strategy Profile
This subsection discusses the notion of underlying game of a given strategy
profile and defines a function that returns such a game. One lemma follows the
definition of the function in the Coq formalism.
The Traditional Way: The example below explains what function is intended.
It amounts to forgetting all the choices.
a a
b oc3  b oc3
oc1 oc2 oc1 oc2
The Inductive and Graphical Way: To prepare the full formalisation of
the idea above, the intended function is defined inductively with the inductive
graphical formalism, in two steps along the structure of strategy profiles. First
step: the underlying game of a strategy profile where no choice has been made,
i.e., a leaf strategy profile, is a game where no choice is required, i.e., a leaf
game.
a
s2g
 a
The second step needs case splitting along the structure of the first list, i.e.,
whether it is empty or not.
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a a
nil s l’
s2g
 
s2g s
map s2g l′
a a
s0 :: l s l’
s2g
 
s2g s0
map s2g (l ++s :: l′)
The Inductive and Formal Way: The intended function is inductively and
formally defined in Coq, and called s2g, which stands for “strategy profile to
game”.
Fixpoint s2g (s : Strat) : Game :=
match s with
| sL oc ⇒ gL oc
| sN a sl sc sr ⇒
match sl with
| nil ⇒ gN a (s2g sc) (map s2g sr)
| s’ ::sl’ ⇒ gN a (s2g s’) ((map s2g sl’)++(s2g sc)::(map s2g sr))
end
end.
The next result states that if the two lists of substrategy profiles of two
strategy profiles have, component-wise, the same underlying games, then the
two original strategy profiles also have the same underlying game.
Lemma map s2g sN s2g : ∀ a sl sc sr sl’ sc’ sr’,
map s2g (sl ++ sc :: sr) = map s2g (sl’ ++ sc’ :: sr’) →
s2g (sN a sl sc sr) = s2g (sN a sl’ sc’ sr’).
Proof Double case split on sl and sl’ being empty and use map app. 
6.4 Induced Outcome of a Strategy Profile
This subsection discusses the notion of outcome induced by a strategy profile,
and defines a function that computes such an outcome. Three lemmas follow the
definition of the function in the Coq formalism.
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The Traditional Way: Starting at the root of a strategy profile and following
the agents’ consecutive choices leads to a leaf, and hereby to an outcome. The
following example explains what function is intended.
a
b c a  oc5
oc1 oc2 oc3 b oc6
oc4 oc5
The Inductive and Graphical Way: To prepare the full formalisation of
the idea above, the intended function is defined inductively with the inductive
graphical formalism, in two steps along the structure of strategy profiles. First
step: the outcome induced by a leaf strategy profile is the enclosed outcome.
oc
IO
 oc
Second step: follow the choice at the root and consider the chosen substrategy
profile.
a
l s l’
IO
 IO( s )
The Inductive and Formal Way: The intended function, called InducedOut-
come, is inductively and formally defined in Coq.
Fixpoint InducedOutcome (s : Strat) : Outcome :=
match s with
| sL oc ⇒ oc
| sN a sl sc sr ⇒ InducedOutcome sc
end.
The following lemma, proved by induction on sl, states that the outcomes
used by the underlying game of a strategy profile are all used by the underlying
game of a bigger strategy profile whose chosen substrategy profile is the original
strategy profile.
Lemma UsedOutcomes sN incl : ∀ a sl sc sr,
incl (UsedOutcomes (s2g sc)) (UsedOutcomes (s2g (sN a sl sc sr))).
The next result says that the outcome induced by a strategy profile is also
an outcome used in the underlying game.
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Lemma Used Induced Outcomes : ∀ s : Strat,
In (InducedOutcome s) (UsedOutcomes (s2g s)).
Proof Write the claim as a predicate on s and apply the induction principle
Strat ind2 where Q l s l’ is In (InducedOutcome s) (UsedOutcomes (s2g s)).
For the last induction case invoke UsedOutcomes sN incl. 
Note that if the underlying game of a strategy profile is a leaf game enclosing
a given outcome, then the strategy profile is a leaf strategy profile enclosing the
same outcome, so that the outcome induced by the strategy profile is also the
same outcome: if s2g s=gL oc then InducedOutcome s=oc. The following lemma
is the list version of the remark above. It is prove by induction on ls.
Lemma map s2g gL InducedOutcome : ∀ ls loc,
map s2g ls =map (fun y ⇒ gL y) loc → map InducedOutcome ls = loc.
7 Convertibility
The first subsection defines convertibility, which will be used to formally define
the notion of Nash equilibrium in section 8. The second subsection designs an
inductive proof principle for convertibility.
7.1 Definition of Convertibility
This subsection discusses the notion of convertibility, which is the ability of an
agent to convert a strategy profile into another strategy profile, and defines a
predicate accounting for it. Four lemmas follow its definition in Coq.
The Traditional Way: An agent is (usually implicitly) granted the ability
to change his choices at all nodes he owns, as shown in the following example.
Agent b can change his choices at the nodes where b is displayed in bold font,
and only at those nodes.
a a
b b b
Conv b
←→ b b b
oc1 a oc4 b oc7 oc8 oc1 a oc4 b oc7 oc8
oc2 oc3 oc5 oc6 oc2 oc3 oc5 oc6
The Inductive and Graphical Way: To prepare the full formalisation of
the idea above, the intended function is defined inductively with the inductive
graphical formalism, in two steps along the structure of strategy profiles. Let
b be an agent. First step: Let oc be an outcome. Agent b can convert the leaf
strategy profile enclosing oc into itself by changing some, actually none of his
choices since none has been made.
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oc
Conv b
←→ oc
Second step: let
s0 . . . sn :: nil
and
s′0 . . . s
′
n :: nil
be two lists
of strategy profiles such that for all i between 0 and n, si
Conv b
←→ s′i
The second step involves compound strategy profiles, and needs case splitting
on the “converting agent” owning the roots or not. Also let a be another agent.
For all i between 0 and n, agent b can perform the following conversion by
combining at once all his conversion abilities in all the substrategy profiles.
a
s0 . . . si−1 :: nil
si
si+1 . . . sn :: nil
Conv b
a
s′0 . . . s
′
i−1 :: nil
s′i
s′i+1 . . . s
′
n :: nil
When a equals b, the agent b can also change his choice at the root owned
by a. In that case, the agent b can perform the following conversion for all i and
k between 0 and n.
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bs0 . . . si−1 :: nil
si
si+1 . . . sn :: nil
Conv b
b
s′0 . . . s
′
k−1 :: nil
s′k
s′k+1 . . . s
′
n :: nil
The Inductive and Formal Way: The following definition accounts for agents
being able to unilaterally change part of their choices. Conv, which means strat-
egy profile convertibility, and ListConv, which means component-wise convert-
ibility of list of strategy profiles, are defined by mutual induction via the word
with, within the same definition.
Inductive Conv : Agent → Strat → Strat → Prop :=
| convLeaf : ∀ b oc, Conv b (sL oc)(sL oc)
| convNode : ∀ b a sl sl’ sc sc’ sr sr’, (length sl=length sl’ ∨ a = b) →
ListConv b (sl++(sc::sr)) (sl’++(sc’ ::sr’)) →
Conv b (sN a sl sc sr)(sN a sl’ sc’ sr’)
with
ListConv : Agent → list Strat → list Strat → Prop :=
| lconvnil : ∀ b, ListConv b nil nil
| lconvcons : ∀ b s s’ tl tl’, Conv b s s’ → ListConv b tl tl’ →
ListConv b (s ::tl)(s’ ::tl’).
The formula length sl=length sl’ ∨ a = b ensures that only the owner of
a node can change his choice at that node. It corresponds to the case split-
ting in the inductive and graphical definition above. ListConv b (sl++(sc::sr))
(sl’++(sc’ ::sr’)) guarantees that this property holds also in the substrategy pro-
files. ListConv corresponds to the dots in the inductive and graphical definition
above. One may think of avoiding a mutual definition for Conv by using the
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already defined rel vector instead of ListConv. However, the Coq versions 8.0
and 8.1 do not permit it, presumably because it would require to pass the whole
Conv object as an argument (to rel vector) while not yet fully defined.
The following two lemmas establish the equivalence between ListConv on the
one hand and rel vector and Conv on the other hand. They are both proved by
induction on the list l and by a case splitting on l’.
Lemma ListConv rel vector : ∀ a l l’,
ListConv a l l’ → rel vector (Conv a) l l’.
Lemma rel vector ListConv : ∀ a l l’,
rel vector (Conv a) l l’ → ListConv a l l’ .
The next two results state reflexivity property of Conv and ListConv.
Lemma Conv refl : ∀ a s , Conv a s s.
Proof Let a be an agent and s a strategy profile. It suffices to prove that P s
where P s’ is Conv a s’ s’ by definition. Apply the induction principle Strat ind2
where Q sl sc sr is ListConv a (sl++sc::sr) (sl++sc::sr) by definition. Checking
all cases is straightforward. 
Lemma ListConv refl : ∀ a l, ListConv a l l.
Proof By rel vector ListConv, induction on the list l, and Conv refl. 
7.2 Induction Principle for Convertibility
The Inductive and Formal Way: A suitable induction principle for convert-
ibility is automatically generated in Coq with the command Scheme, and hereby
is a theorem in Coq. The principle states that under four conditions, Conv a is
a subrelation of the binary relation P a for all agents a. Note that in order to
prove such a property, the user has to imagine a workable predicate P0.
conv lconv ind : ∀ (P : Agent → Strat → Strat → Prop)
(P0 : Agent → list Strat → list Strat → Prop),
(∀ b oc, P b (sL oc) (sL oc)) →
(∀ b a sl sl’ sc sc’ sr sr’, length sl = length sl’ ∨ a = b → ListConv b (sl ++
sc :: sr) (sl’ ++ sc’ :: sr’) → P0 b (sl ++ sc :: sr) (sl’ ++ sc’ :: sr’) → P b
(sN a sl sc sr) (sN a sl’ sc’ sr’)) →
(∀ b, P0 b nil nil) →
(∀ b s s’ tl tl’, Conv b s s’ → P b s s’ → ListConv b tl tl’ → P0 b tl tl’ → P0
b (s :: tl) (s’ :: tl’)) →
∀ a s s0, Conv a s s0 → P a s s0
This induction principle is used below to prove that two convertible strategy
profiles have the same underlying game.
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Lemma Conv s2g : ∀ (a : Agent)(s s’ : Strat), Conv a s s’ → s2g s = s2g s’.
Proof Assume s and s’ convertible by a. Write s2g s = s2g s’ as P a s s’
for some P and proceed by the induction principle conv lconv ind where P0 b
l l’ is (ListConv b l l’ → map s2g l=map s2g l’) by definition. The remainder
invokes map s2g sN s2g. 
8 Concepts of Equilibrium
This section defines the notions of preference, happiness, Nash equilibrium, and
subgame perfect equilibrium in the new and abstract formalism. Two lemmas
follow these definitions.
In traditional game theory, the agents implicitly prefer strictly greater pay-
offs, and thus also prefer payoff functions granting them strictly greater payoffs.
In the abstract formalism, the agents’ preferences for outcomes are explicitly rep-
resented by binary relations over the outcomes, one relation per agent. Below,
OcPref a is the preference of agent a.
Variable OcPref : Agent → Outcome → Outcome → Prop.
Since every strategy profile induces an outcome, the preferences over out-
comes yield preferences over strategy profiles. For instance, if agent a prefers oc1
to oc3, then he prefers the following right-hand strategy profile to the left-hand
one. As to agent b, it could be either way since no specific property is assumed
about preferences.
a a
b oc3 b oc3
oc1 oc2 oc1 oc2
Formally in Coq, preference over strategy profiles is defined as follows.
Definition StratPref (a : Agent)(s s’ : Strat) : Prop :=
OcPref a (InducedOutcome s)(InducedOutcome s’).
If an agent cannot convert a given strategy profile to any preferred one, then
he is said to be happy with respect to the given strategy profile. For instance
the following strategy profile makes agent a happy iff agent a does not prefer
oc2 to oc3, whatever his other preferences are.
a
b oc3
oc1 oc2
Formally in Coq, happiness of an agent is defined as follows.
Definition Happy (s : Strat)(a : Agent) : Prop := ∀ s’,
Conv a s s’ → ¬StratPref a s s’.
A strategy profile that makes every agent happy is called a Nash equilibrium.
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Definition Eq (s : Strat) : Prop := ∀ a, Happy s a.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium such that all of its
substrategy profiles are subgame perfect equilibria. Compare this definition with
the informal and more complicated one in section 2.
Fixpoint SPE (s : Strat) : Prop := Eq s ∧
match s with
| sL oc ⇒ True
| sN a sl sc sr ⇒ (listforall SPE sl) ∧ SPE sc ∧ (listforall SPE sr)
end.
Therefore, a subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma SPE is Eq : ∀ s : Strat, SPE s → Eq s.
The following provides a sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be a Nash
equilibrium: at the root of a compound strategy profile, if the chosen substrategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium, and if the owner of the root cannot convert any of
his other options into a substrategy profile that he prefers to his current choice,
then the compound strategy profile is also a Nash equilibrium. This is stated in
Coq below.
Lemma Eq subEq choice : ∀ a sl sc sr,
(∀ s s’, In s sl ∨ In s sr → Conv a s s’ → ¬StratPref a sc s’) →
Eq sc → Eq (sN a sl sc sr).
Proof Let be a, sl, sc, sr and assume the two premises. Also assume that
an agent a’ can convert sN a sl sc sr to s’ that he prefers. Now try to de-
rive a contradiction from the hypothesis. For this, note that s’ equals sN a sl’
sc’ sr’ for some sl’, sc’, and sr’. Case split on sl and sl’ having or not the
same length. If they have the same length then use the equilibrium assump-
tion together with rel vector app cons same length and ListConv rel vector.
If sl and sl’ have different lengths then a’ equals a. The remainder invokes
rel vector app cons different length and ListConv rel vector. 
The converse of this lemma also holds, but it is omitted in this paper.
9 Existence of Equilibria
This section generalises the notion of “backward induction” for abstract sequen-
tial games, and shows that it yields a subgame perfect equilibrium when prefer-
ences are totally ordered. But it also shows that it may not always yield a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for arbitrary preferences. However, this section even-
tually proves that acyclicity of decidable preferences is a necessary and sufficient
condition for guaranteeing computable existence of Nash equilibrium/subgame
perfect equilibrium.
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9.1 “Backward Induction”
This subsection starts with an informal discussion, and continues with defini-
tions in the inductive graphical formalism. Eventually, a “backward induction”
function is defined in Coq, and one lemma follows.
The Traditional Way: Informally, the idea is to perform “backward induc-
tion” on all subgames first, and then to let the owner of the root choose one
strategy profile that suits him best among the newly built strategy profiles.
When preferences are partially ordered, the agent can choose in order to max-
imise his preference; when they are not partially ordered, a procedure slightly
more general may be needed. Lemma Choose and split defined in subsection 4.4
relates to such a procedure. (More specifically, the proof of the lemma is such
a procedure.) For instance, let oc1 . . . oc6 be six outcomes such that a prefers
oc5 to oc2, and b prefers oc2 to oc1 and oc1 to oc2, and nothing else. A “back-
ward induction” process is detailed below. On the left-hand picture, b chooses
by Choose and split. On the right-hand picture, agent a being “aware” of b’s
choice procedure chooses accordingly, also by Choose and split.
a a
b oc4 b b oc4 b
oc1 oc2 oc3 oc5 oc6 oc1 oc2 oc3 oc5 oc6
The Inductive and Graphical Way: To prepare the full formalisation of
the idea above, the intended function is defined inductively with the inductive
graphical formalism, in two steps along the structure of strategy profiles. First
step: performing “backward induction” on a leaf game that encloses an outcome
yields a leaf strategy profile that encloses the same outcome.
a
BI
 a
Second step: Assume that “backward induction” is defined for the games
g0, . . . , gn. An agent a can choose one strategy profile among BI g0, . . . , BI gn
by Choose and split and his own preference, as below.
(BI g0) . . . (BI gn) :: nil
Choose and split (StratPref dec a)
left list choice right list
(BI g0) . . . (BI gi−1) :: nil BI gi (BI gi+1) . . . (BI gn) :: nil
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Then, “backward induction” can be defined on the following compound game.
a
g0
g1 . . . gn :: nil
↓ BI
a
(BI g0) . . . (BI gi−1) :: nil
BI gi
(BI gi+1) . . . (BI gn) :: nil
The Inductive and Formal Way: The definition using the inductive graphical
formalism above is translated into Coq formalism. First, assume that preferences
over outcomes are decidable.
Hypothesis OcPref dec : ∀ (a : Agent), rel dec (OcPref a).
Subsequently, preferences over strategy profiles are also decidable.
Lemma StratPref dec : ∀ (a : Agent), rel dec (StratPref a).
Next, the generalisation of “backward induction”, with respect to the pref-
erences above, is defined by recursion. For the sake of readability, the definition
displayed below is a slight simplification of the actual Coq code.
Fixpoint BI (g : Game) : Strat :=
match g with
| gL oc ⇒ sL oc
| gN a g l ⇒ let (sl,sc,sr):=
Choose and split (StratPref dec a) (map BI l) (BI g) in
sN a sl sc sr
end.
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As stated below, the underlying game of the image by BI of a given game is
the same game.
Lemma BI s2g : ∀ g : Game, s2g (BI g)=g.
Proof Rewrite the claim as ∀ g, P g for some P. Apply the induction principle
Game ind2 where Q g l is s2g (BI g)=g ∧ map s2g (map BI ) l=l. For the last
induction case, invoke Choose and split and map app. 
9.2 The Total Order Case
In this subsection only, assume transitivity and irreflexivity of preferences over
outcomes. Subsequently, those propertiesalso hold for preferences over strategy
profiles.
Hypothesis OcPref irrefl : ∀ (a : Agent), irreflexive (OcPref a).
Hypothesis OcPref trans : ∀ (a : Agent), transitive (OcPref a).
Lemma StratPref irrefl : ∀ (a : Agent), irreflexive (StratPref a).
Lemma StratPref trans : ∀ (a : Agent), transitive (StratPref a).
Irreflexivity of preferences guarantees that leaf strategy profiles are Nash
equilibria.
Lemma Leaf Eq : ∀ oc : Outcome, Eq (sL oc).
If preferences are total over a given list of outcomes, then for any sequential
game using only outcomes from the list, “backward Induction” yields subgame
perfect equilibrium. This is the translation of Kuhn’s result into abstract se-
quential game formalism.
Lemma BI SPE : ∀ loc, (∀ (a : Agent), total (OcPref a) loc) →
∀ g : Game, incl (UsedOutcomes g) loc → SPE (BI g).
Proof Assume loc, a list of outcomes, and the totality property. Write incl
(UsedOutcomes g) loc → SPE (BI g) as P g and proceed by the induction
principle Game ind2 where Q g l is listforall (fun g’ ⇒ incl (UsedOutcomes g’)
loc) (g::l) → SPE (BI g) ∧ listforall SPE (map BI l). The first three cases are
straightforward. For the fourth and last case assume g, l, and the other premises,
such as an agent a. In order to prove that the “backward induction” of the com-
pound game gN a g l is a subgame perfect equilibrium, first note that all sub-
strategy profiles of this “backward induction” are subgame perfect equilibria, by
the induction hypotheses, listforall appr and listforall appr. Then, the main dif-
ficulty is to prove that it is a Nash equilibrium. For this, invoke Eq subEq choice
after proving its two premises: The induction hypothesis and lemma SPE is Eq
shows that the substrategy profile chosen by a is a Nash equilibrium. For the
other premise required for invoking Eq subEq choice, assume a substrategy pro-
file not chosen by a. The induction hypothesis and lemma SPE is Eq show that
it is a Nash equilibrium. Next, assume that this Nash equilibrium is convertible
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by a into another strategy profile, and show that a does not prefer this new
strategy profile to his current choice. For this, invoke decidability, irreflexivity,
transitivity, and totality of preferences, as well as lemmas listforall In, UsedOut-
comes gN, map inverse, Used Induced Outcomes and Conv s2g. 
9.3 Limitation
Now, no property is assumed about the preferences. Consider the three outcomes
oc1, oc2 and oc3, and an agent a that prefers oc2 to oc3, and nothing else. The
strategy profile below is obtained by the “backward induction” function define in
subsection 9.1. However, it is not a Nash equilibrium since the current induced
outcome is oc3, but it can be converted by a into the preferred oc2.
a
a oc3
oc1 oc2
Informally, when dealing with totally ordered preferences, the notions of
“backward induction” and subgame perfect equilibrium coincide although their
definitions differ; they are the same in extension, but are different in intension.
This difference in intension is critical when dealing with partially ordered pref-
erences: as shown by the example above, “backward induction” no longer yields
Nash equilibrium, let alone subgame perfect equilibrium.
9.4 General Case
Until this subsection, equilibrium concepts and related notions have been defined
with respect to given preferences: a preference binary relation was associated
with an agent once for all. In the following, equilibrium concepts and related
notions are abstracted over preferences. It means that preferences become a
parameter of the definitions and lemmas. For instance, instead of writing Eq s
to say that s is a Nash equilibrium, one shall write Eq OcPref s to say that s is
a Nash equilibrium with respect to the family of preferences defined by OcPref.
As formally stated in the two lemmas below, given two families of prefer-
ences and given a strategy profile, if for every agent the restriction of his first
preference to the outcomes used by the strategy profile is a subrelation of his
second preference, and if the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium/subgame
perfect equilibrium with respect to the second preferences then it is also a Nash
equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium with respect to the first preferences.
Informally, the less arcs an agent’s preference has, the more strategy profiles
make the agent happy.
Lemma Eq order inclusion : ∀ OcPref OcPref’ s,
(∀ a : Agent,
sub rel (restriction (OcPref a) (UsedOutcomes (s2g s))) (OcPref’ a)) →
Eq OcPref’ s → Eq OcPref s.
Proof Invoke Used Induced Outcomes and Conv s2g. 
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Lemma SPE order inclusion : ∀ OcPref OcPref’ s,
(∀ a : Agent,
sub rel (restriction (OcPref a) (UsedOutcomes (s2g s))) (OcPref’ a)) →
SPE OcPref’ s → SPE OcPref s.
Proof Assume two families of preferences and rewrite the claim as ∀ s, P s
for some P. Then apply Strat ind2 where Q sl sc sr is (∀ a, sub rel (restriction
(OcPref a) (UsedOutcomes (s2g (sN a sl sc sr)))) (OcPref’ a)) → listforall
(SPE OcPref’) sl → SPE OcPref’ sc → listforall (SPE OcPref’) sr → list-
forall (SPE OcPref ) sl ∧ SPE OcPref sc ∧ listforall (SPE OcPref ) sr. For
the first and fifth induction steps, apply Eq order inclusion. For the third and
fourth induction step, invoke lemmas transitive sub rel, sub rel restriction incl,
incl appr, incl appl, and incl refl. 
The following lemma generalises Kuhn’s result to acyclic preferences (instead
of totally ordered). It invokes a result related to topological sorting proved in [11].
Theorem acyclic SPE : ∀ OcPref,
(∀ a, rel dec (OcPref a)) →
(∀ a, irreflexive (clos trans Outcome (OcPref a))) →
∀ g, {s : Strat | s2g s=g ∧ SPE OcPref s}.
Proof Assume a family of decidable acyclic preferences. Let g be a game.
According to [11], by topological sorting there exists a family of decidable acyclic
preferences that are strict total orders including the original preferences on the
outcomes used by g. A subgame perfect equilibrium can be computed by BI SPE.
Conclude by SPE order inclusion. 
The following property relates to SPE is Eq.
Theorem SPE Eq : ∀ OcPref,
(∀ a, rel dec (OcPref a)) →
(∀ g : Game, {s : Strat | s2g s=g ∧ SPE OcPref s}) →
∀ g : Game, {s : Strat | s2g s=g ∧ Eq OcPref s}.
The next result says that if all games have Nash equilibria with respect to a
given family of preferences, then these preferences are acyclic.
The Traditional Way Informally, let an agent a prefer x1 to x0, x2 to x1,
and so on, and x0 to xn. The game displayed below has no Nash equilibrium,
as suggested graphically. The symbol s −→a s’ means that agent a both prefers
s’ to s and can convert s to s’. So, the formula s −→a s’ witnesses the agent’s
non-happiness.
a
x0 x1 . . . xn
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a a
−→a
x0 x1 . . . xn x0 x1 . . . xn
a a
−→a
. . . xi xi+1 . . . . . . xi xi+1 . . .
The Formal Way Now, the corresponding formal statement and its proof.
Theorem Eq acyclic : ∀ OcPref,
(∀ a, rel dec (OcPref a)) →
(∀ g : Game, {s : Strat | s2g s=g ∧ Eq OcPref s}) →
∀ a : Agent, irreflexive (clos trans Outcome (OcPref a)).
Proof Assume all premises. In particular, let a be an agent and oc be an
outcome related to itself by the transitive closure of the agent’s preference. Prove
a contradiction by building a game such that every strategy profile for the game
can be improved upon, as follows. By lemma clos trans path, get an actual path
loc from oc to itself with respect to the preference. If loc is empty then invoke
lemma Conv refl. If loc is not empty then, thanks to the assumption, compute a
Nash equilibrium for the game with root owned by agent a and the children being
leaves enclosing oc for the first and the elements of loc for the others. Case split
on the right-hand substrategy profile list of the Nash equilibrium being empty. If
it is empty, and the left-hand substrategy profile list of the Nash equilibrium as
well, then the root of the game has two or more children and the strategy profile
has one only, hence a contradiction. If the left-hand substrategy profile list is not
empty then ListConv refl, map s2g gL InducedOutcome, path app elim right,
and map app may be needed. If the right-hand substrategy profile list of the
Nash equilibrium is not empty then invoke associativity of list appending as
well as the lemmas mentioned just above, and a case splitting on the left-hand
substrategy profile list again. 
9.5 Examples
Partial Order and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium As in section 9.3, con-
sider three outcomes oc1, oc2 and oc3, and an agent a that only prefers oc2
to oc3. Each of the three possible linear extensions of a’s preference, prior to
“backward induction”, leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium as shown below,
where the symbol < represents the different linear extensions. Compare with the
“backward induction” without prior linear extension of subsection 9.3.
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oc2 < oc3 < oc1 oc3 < oc2 < oc1 oc3 < oc1 < oc2
a a a
a oc3 a oc3 a oc3
oc1 oc2 oc1 oc2 oc1 oc2
In the same way, the results obtained in this section show that subgame
perfect equilibrium exists for games with preferences discussed in section 3.
Benevolent and Malevolent Selfishness In subsection 3.1 were defined
benevolent and malevolent selfishnesses. It is not surprising that, sometimes,
benevolent selfishness yields better payoffs for all agents than malevolent self-
ishness. For instance compare the induced payoff functions below. The lefthand
“backward induction” corresponds to benevolent selfishness, and the righthand
one to malevolent selfishness.
a a
b 1, 1 b 1, 1
0, 2 2, 2 0, 2 2, 2
On the contrary, malevolent selfishness may yield better payoffs for all agents
than benevolent selfishness, as shown below. The lefthand “backward induction”
corresponds to benevolent selfishness, and the righthand one to malevolent self-
ishness.
a a
b 1, 1 b 1, 1
a 2, 2 a 2, 2
0, 0 0, 3 0, 0 0, 3
10 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new inductive formalism for sequential games. it also
replaces real-valued payoff functions with atomic objects called outcomes, and
the usual total order over the reals with arbitrary preferences. This way, it also
defines an abstract version of sequential games, with similar tree structure and
notion of convertibility as for traditional sequential games. The notions of Nash
equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and “backward induction” are trans-
lated into the new formalism. When preferences are totally ordered, “backward
induction”guarantees existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for all sequential
games, thus translating Kuhn’s result in the new formalism. However, an exam-
ple shows that “backward induction” fails to provide equilibrium for non-totally
ordered preferences, e.g., partial orders. But when preferences are acyclic, it is
still possible to perform “backward induction” on a game whose preferences have
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been linearly extended. This yields a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
with respect to the acyclic preferences, because removing arcs from a preference
relation amounts to removing reasons for being unhappy. So, given a collection
of outcomes, the following three propositions are equivalent:
– The agents’ preferences over the given outcomes are acyclic.
– Every game built over the given outcomes has a Nash equilibrium.
– Every game built over the given outcomes has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The formalism introduced in this paper is suitable for proofs in Coq, which is
a (highly reliable) constructive proof assistant. This way, the above-mentioned
equivalence is fully computer-certified using Coq. Beside the additional guarantee
of correctness provided by the Coq proof, the activity of formalisation also helps
clearly identify the useful definitions and the main articulations of the proof.
Informally, a result due to Aumann states that, when dealing with traditional
sequential games, “common knowledge of rationality among agents” is equivalent
to “backward induction” (where “rationality” means playing in order to max-
imise one’s payoff). This is arguable in abstract sequential games if one expects
“common knowledge of rationality among agents” to imply Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, “backward induction” may not imply Nash equilibrium, as seen in this
paper. Therefore, “backward induction” may not imply “common knowledge of
rationality among agents”. Instead, one may wonder whether “common knowl-
edge of rationality among agents” is equivalent to subgame perfect equilibrium,
whatever it may mean, when preferences are acyclic, i.e. rational in some sense.
In this case, the difference between “backward induction” and subgame perfect
equilibrium seems critical again.
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